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DISCUSIÓN
«In-Between Believing» and Degrees of Belief 
Darrell Patrick Rowbottom
RESUMEN
Schwitzgebel (2001) —de ahora en adelante «S»–– ofrece tres ejemplos para 
convencernos de que hay situaciones en que los individuos no se pueden describir 
adecuadamente como creyendo que p o no creyéndolo, sino que están más bien en 
«estados de creencia intermedios».1 Argumenta a continuación que no hay estrategias 
«bayesianas» para explicar tales estados y propone una explicación disposicional.  
No tengo ninguna objeción fundamental a la idea de que podría haber «estados 
de creencia intermedios». Lo que argumentaré más bien es que: (I) S no presenta ar-
gumentos convincentes que apoyen el que haya realmente tales estados; (II) S no 
muestra, contrariamente a lo que afirma, que no se pueda dar cuenta de los «estados 
de creencia intermedios» en términos de grados de creencia; (III) la explicación dis-
posicional que hace S de los «estados de creencia intermedios» es más problemática 
que la alternativa de los «grados de creencia».  
ABSTRACT
Schwitzgebel (2001) —henceforth «S»— offers three examples in order to con-
vince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describ-
able as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in «in-between states of 
belief».1 He then argues that there are no «Bayesian» or representational strategies for 
explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. 
I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be «in-
between states of belief». What I shall argue, rather, is that: (I) S does not provide a 
convincing argument that there really are such states; (II) S does not show, as he 
claims, that «in-between states of belief» could not be accounted for in terms of de-
grees of belief; (III) S’s dispositional account of «in-between states of belief» is more 
problematic than the «degree of belief» alternative. 
I. THREE DISPARATE EXAMPLES
S’s first example concerns an individual named Konstantin, who lived 
across the hall from S during his freshman year. At the time, S «fully and 
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completely believed» that his surname was whatever it was. At eighty, S will 
have no memory of Konstantin at all. But at points in the middle, S will re-
member correctly or not depending on context. Against the view that the be-
lief will remain, but simply become less easy to access, he suggests «at some 
point, the belief must pass from fully present, if difficult to access, to absent; 
and it seems odd to say that this happens at some individual moment» 
[Schwitzgebel (2001), p. 77]. Here, however, there seem to be two distinct 
problems. First, S does not consider the possibility that the memory —not be-
lief— might remain fully present, yet that this might become impossible (for 
S) to access in a moment; that a belief can become absent precisely in virtue 
of a memory becoming inaccessible.2 Second, and more trenchantly, even 
when S was living across the hall from Konstantin, there must have been pos-
sible contexts in which he would not have been able to remember the name, 
or even Konstantin; if he’d become blind drunk, or taken a large dose of 
LSD, for instance. So this seems to imply that all belief states are «in-
between states», although the example relies on positing a point at which S 
«fully and completely» believed. It therefore seems that remembering cor-
rectly or not depending on context cannot be correlated with «in-between be-
lieving», after all. 
The second example is of Rohsini. When teaching her 4th grade class, 
she sometimes lists the low prime numbers, and always does so correctly. But 
on other occasions, she provides a definition of the primes which does not 
exclude «1», even though she «knows that 1 is not a prime» [Schwitzgebel 
(2001), p. 77]. If we press her, S says, then she will modify her definition in 
order to exclude «1», although «For the most part, she would happily assent 
to her erroneous definition» [Schwitzgebel (2001), p. 77]. However, this 
seems to be a case where the beliefs in question are simply inconsistent from 
a narrow logical point of view. If Roshini is confronted with (and grasps) the 
fact that her list of primes should include «1», according to her definition, 
then she only has two rational choices. She can cling to the definition and add 
«1» to the list, or alter the definition such that it precludes it from the list.3 No 
appeal to «in-between believing» is required; even brilliant (and reasonable) 
people have inconsistent beliefs, as the case of Russell’s paradox shows. 
The final example is of Antonio, who feels very strongly that God ex-
ists in some contexts, but equally as strongly that He does not in others. But 
note that it is «feelings», and not beliefs or thoughts, which S appeals to. This is 
problematic since it is plausible that there is no determinate relationship —if 
there is any link, howsoever tenuous— between the extent to which one be-
lieves a proposition and the strength of one’s feelings about it. This point is 
familiar to advocates of the subjective interpretation of probability, and was 
first made by Ramsey [(1926), p. 169]: 
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We can, in the first place, suppose that the degree of a belief is something per-
ceptible by its owner; for instance that beliefs differ in the intensity of a feeling 
by which they are accompanied, which might be called a belief-feeling or feel-
ing of conviction, and that by the degree of belief we mean the intensity of this 
feeling. This view would be very inconvenient, for it is not easy to ascribe 
numbers to the intensities of feelings; but apart from this it seems to me ob-
servably false, for the beliefs which we hold most strongly are often accompa-
nied by practically no feeling at all; no one feels strongly about things he takes 
for granted. 
So although Antonio might experience a sort of mild euphoria while in 
the middle of a church service, and thereby «feel sure that there must be a di-
vine force guiding the world» [Schwitzgebel (2001), p. p. 78], it is unclear 
that this directly reflects his (synchronic) degree of belief in the same propo-
sition. Likewise if he «feels certain God is involved» when a child is born, or 
when a friend dies. This is exactly why Ramsey suggested betting procedures 
in order to measure degrees of belief.4
Nevertheless, it is possible that Antonio’s «feelings» might have some
influence on the extent to which he believes the proposition; that they might 
motivate a change. So perhaps S could revise his example by suggesting that 
Antonio’s betting behaviour on the existence of God will change by scenario, 
in line with his emotional state? I come to this in the next section. 
We have seen that S’s examples are disparate. The first could concern 
memory loss, and have little or nothing to do with belief; what’s more, it is 
internally inconsistent. The second appears to concern inconsistent beliefs. 
And the third, which is arguably the best, seems to rely on a dubious link be-
tween strength of feeling about p and degree of belief in p.
II. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE «BAYESIAN» VIEW
After presenting his three examples, S suggests that each involves «in-
between states of belief». He then endeavours to argue that neither a «Bayes-
ian» nor a representational approach could be successful in explicating these. 
I will concentrate on what he says concerning the former.5
Although S calls the view he discusses a «Bayesian» one, this is liable 
to cause serious confusion. For in fact he seems to be concerned with degrees 
of confidence —a.k.a. degrees of belief— rather than the process by which 
these are to be updated. As Gillies [(1998), §1] explains:  
Bayesianism involves two assumptions. The first is that C(h, e & b) satisfies the 
standard axioms of the mathematical theory of probability […] The second as-
sumption is that the degree of confirmation is changed the light of new evi-
dence e by a process known as Bayesian conditionalisation. 
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So S appears to attack only the view that synchronic degrees of belief 
are sufficient to explain «in-between believing».6 His initial argument is as 
follows: 
It is not a matter of degree of belief fluctuating over time; rather Roshini and 
Antonio are, at a single time, disposed quite confidently to assert one thing in 
one sort of situation and to assert its opposite in another.  
This argument is flimsy, however, because the changes can easily be 
accounted for by degrees of belief provided that the background information 
of the individuals differs in those situations. In short, one might consistently 
have the following degrees of belief: D(p, B)=0; D(p, B1) = 1. Change the 
context, and the (relevant conditional) degree of belief in p will change. This 
is precisely what leads De Finetti [(1937), pp. 146-147] to suggest:  
Whatever be the influence of observation on predictions of the future, it never 
implies and never signifies that we correct the primitive evaluation of the prob-
ability P(En+1) after it has been disproved by experience and substitute for it an-
other P*( En+1) which conforms to that experience and is therefore probably 
closer to the real probability; on the contrary, it manifests itself solely in the 
sense that when experience teaches us the result A on the first n trials, our 
judgment will be expressed by the probability P(En+1) no longer, but by the 
probability P(En+1|A), i.e. that which our initial opinion would already attribute 
to the event En+1 considered as conditioned on the outcome A. 
S continues by suggesting that degrees of belief cannot be used to ac-
count for differences in feeling, say in the example of Antonio. But as we 
have already seen in the previous section, it is unclear whether differences in 
feeling are indicators of, although they may sometimes be motivators for, be-
lief; Ramsey’s point that «no one feels strongly about things he takes for 
granted» needs to be countered. 
Nevertheless, perhaps S means to suggest that there can be changes of 
degree of belief without changes in information —or at least relevant infor-
mation (i.e. evidence)—. Take the case of Antonio and revise it as suggested 
previously, such that his betting behaviour on «God exists» changes purely 
on the basis of his mood. To be specific, we can stipulate that changes in in-
formation in the specified scenarios do not affect his (degree of) belief, or 
even that he’ll believe differently if he’s happy than if he’s sad, say, in an 
otherwise identical situation. 
This is an interesting idea. But it does not show that «in-between be-
lieving» cannot be explained in terms of synchronic degrees of belief. Rather, 
it seems to suggest that degrees of belief can be highly unstable, and subject 
to change on the basis of factors that Bayesians don’t consider. In fact, it 
seems that a state of «in-between believing» p might be described exactly as 
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a state in which synchronic degree of belief in p is highly sensitive to changes 
in context.7
I can now explain why the earlier complaint about S’s use of «Bayes-
ian» is more than a cavil. S does have the seed of argument against a Bayes-
ian account of rational belief change, in so far as this fails to consider changes 
in mood and what counts as a rational change in degree of belief in response to 
a change in mood. Yet in so far as Antonio’s changes in belief seem to be thor-
oughly irrational, it is only a seed. For it to grow, it would need to be shown 
that sometimes it is perfectly rational to adjust one’s degree of belief in a 
proposition on the basis of mood alone, trivial cases —such as believing «I 
am happy» as a result of feeling happy— aside. 
III. PROBLEMS FOR THE DISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT
So far, I have shown that S does not argue convincingly for an «in-
between state of belief» which cannot be accounted for by degrees of belief. I 
shall close by suggesting that the dispositional account which he proposes is 
less appealing than the «Bayesian» alternative.8
S invokes the following example, from Ryle [(1949), pp. 134-135], of 
what it is to believe that some ice is dangerously thin: 
[A] to be unhesitant in telling oneself and [B] others that it is thin, [C] in acqui-
escing in other people’s assertions to that effect, [D] in objecting to statements 
to the contrary, [E] in drawing consequences from the original proposition, and 
so forth. But it is also [F] to be prone to skate warily, [G] to shudder, [H] to 
dwell in imagination on possible disasters and [I] to warn other skaters. 
S then suggests that «Roughly speaking, the greater the proportion of 
stereotypical dispositions a person possesses, and the more central these are 
to the stereotype, the more appropriate it is to describe him as having the be-
lief in question» [Schwitzgebel (2001), p. 81]. But now take the individual 
who has dispositions A, E, F, G, & H, yet not B, C, D, & I. A credible expla-
nation is that he is a nasty prankster who is sure that the ice is dangerously 
thin, but would delight in seeing someone else fall through it! Here, then, 
there seems to be «a further truth about the subject’s real state of belief un-
derlying his mixed dispositional profile» [Schwitzgebel (2001), p. 82]. Is this 
not just a synchronic degree of belief, plus some appropriate mechanism 
(and/or implicit policy) for updating it? 
It might be added that talk of «the proportion of stereotypical disposi-
tions» implies that there is a finite number of these, in the aforementioned 
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case, even though this is far from clear. If there is a finite number, can S state 
them? If not, how exactly is a proportion to be measured, or even made sense of? 
The first of these problems, at least, is addressed by the (rather compli-
cated) discussion of «excusing conditions» in Schwitzgebel (2002). But what 
is still lacking is an argument that the dispositional account is preferable to 
all possible (or at least currently conceivable) accounts using degrees of be-
lief; that it enjoys more explanatory power, and/or is preferable in terms of 
theoretical virtues (such as simplicity). I have argued that this is unclear at 
best, since S’s criticisms of degrees of belief —as potential means of expli-
cating «in-between believing»— fall wide of the mark. 
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NOTES
1 Price (1969) and Dennett (1987) provide precedents. 
2 Saying that the ability to recall something can vanish in a moment is not the 
same as saying that the thing itself vanishes. One could say that there are no available 
mnemonic triggers in principle, and not just in practice, at such a point. See also 
Bernecker (2007), who argues that remembering that p does not imply believing that p.
3 She might be content to tell the occasional white lie to her students, to help 
them to understand more easily, of course. But in that event, it’s also clear that no ap-
peal to «in-between believing» is required.
4 For more on this, see Gillies [(2000), pp. 55-65]. On a novel problem with this 
account, see Rowbottom (2007a).
5 I also think that S’s arguments against the representational view are rather 
weak. He writes: «to speak of the subject as “sort of” or “halfway” representing some-
thing is unnatural» [p. 80], but does not consider that to speak of a better or worse rep-
resentation is perfectly natural, especially in pictorial cases. Intuitively speaking, an 
impressionist painting of the Houses of Parliament is a less accurate representation than 
a wooden model, made to scale.
6 Bayesianism does not require a subjective interpretation of probability, either. 
Keynes (1921), for example, advocates a logical view where probabilities are relations 
between propositions. His claims concerning rational degrees of belief are derivative 
from this view.
7 See also the further examples, along with another discussion of degrees of be-
lief, in Schwitzgebel [(2002) pp. 260-262]. My criticism applies equally to these. 
8 Once again, note that I am not advocating Bayesianism — in fact I reject it, as 
I explain in Rowbottom (2007b) — but only the idea that «in-between believing» can 
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be explained by degrees of belief. As argued above, pace Schwitzgebel (2001), there 
is nothing especially Bayesian about this view.
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